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In this account of American science fiction writer Philip K. Dick's work, the aim has been to describe the involvement 
of assumptions inherited from philosophical and scientific discourse in both the understanding and  experience of 
subjectivity. It is argued that Dick's representations of identity both picture the tensions engendered by the prevalent 
reality standard with which he had to deal and, in their development, come to articulate a path beyond the impasse 
this standard presents. The fundamental insufficiency of the world view Dick's fiction both encounters and embodies 
is epitomised by the twin questions with which he characterised his work: 'what is human?' and 'what is real?' In 
coming to terms with the significance of these questions the work of the Austrian philosopher and scientist Rudolf 
Steiner has been engaged as a critical foil to Dick's fictionalising. Special attention is given to the epistemological 
basis of Steiner's anthroposophy and its account of the world and our peculiar situation in it that, far from asserting 
any external and unvarying standard of truth, describes a process essentially evolutionary and unfixed. It is claimed 
that in Steiner, as in Dick, the human contribution to both identity and reality constitutes the validity of each, a matrix 
of subject and object from which one's self is delivered, in each instance a new beginning. 

Introduction
KNOWLEDGE IS NOT GAINED BY ASSERTING ONLY ONE'S OWN POINT OF VIEW, BUT THROUGH IMMERSION 
IN STREAMS OF THOUGHT FOREIGN TO ONE'S OWN.
RUDOLF STEINER
Around the time he began to write fiction for a living, Philip K. Dick, as he was later to recollect, had already begun ' to develop 
the idea that each creature lives in a world somewhat different from all the other creatures and their worlds.' 1 If in sustaining 
such an idea over time I was to develop my understanding of its consequences, it is possible that I, like Dick, might also come to 
question the nature of my experience in the most fundamental way. For Dick these consequences could be abstracted and 
distilled in the two questions with which his fiction has most often been identified: “what is human?” and “what is real?” These 
questions stood for Dick himself no less than they continue to for his readers and critics as an epitome of his thinking and 
work. Themes like these are of course essential to disciplines such as philosophy and theology – subjects in which he placed 
great stock – but, in staging his own inquest by means of genre fiction, came to be equally as indispensable for Dick. However, 
it should be pointed out that science fiction was, at least for the first half of his career, a fall back, a consequence of the 
'mainstream' novels he was also writing failing, without exception, to find a publisher on their own merit. The service that those 
various publishing houses performed for his readers in rejecting his efforts to become a 'serious' writer could hardly have 
been apparent to the young author of the fifties and sixties. At that time writing science fiction was something of an 
embarrassment to him, often qualified as a temporary measure, a means to an income while he worked on more respectable 
material. It's something of an irony then that all but one of these serious literary works were published posthumously and, at 
that stage, only on the strength of his reputation as a writer of innovative and unique science fiction. This instance of 
frustrated aspiration however, a few words in the telling, has the means to say much more about the basis of Dick's fictions 
and give further grounds for the way in which the various worlds he understood us as inhabiting, 'each to his own,' was a 
narrative device in the true sense of the word – a way of organising and understanding life. 
The 'visionary,' writes Andrew Welburn, is that which 'undertakes to create its own meaning, or to discover a pattern of truth 
rather than work within an accepted framework of ideas.'2 This is clearly a way in which Dick's work may be understood. That 
his paradoxical narratives of marginal and eccentric everymen fighting for survival in the face of pervasive and omnipotent 
realities – whether technological, psychological, or ideological – have so frequently been adapted and projected for us onto the 
façade of popular culture is evidence perhaps that the 'pattern of truth' Dick was discovering was possessed of a more than 
personal significance. However, despite his early assertions (to which he would occasionally return) that we are caught in the 
impasse of our own private worlds, never quite coincident with those worlds of other selves which we infer from their 
appearance, his fictional work tended increasingly toward a demonstration of what he called 'joint hallucinations.'3 An 
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explanation for the nature of these 'hallucinations' might reasonably enough lead the curious to a study of metaphysics; a life-
long passion of Dick's to which allusion has already been made. This philosophical bent then, not arising as a consolation of his  
exile to the literary ghetto of science fiction, but a persistent quality of his outlook on life, should be equally manifest in his  
early mainstream manuscripts. And, in a sense, it is; present for the most part in his sketching the tensions and difficulties of 
relationships (something he would later bemoan the absence of in the science fiction of his time), the way in which a clash of  
ideologies emerges not only in the contact of one people with another but, equally, between individual and individual. Our own 
world, 'somewhat' different from that of others, may encounter pressure to change in the face of such difference, in the 
meeting with worlds 'without' my own. In his way Dick had already begun to articulate something every writer – more or less 
selfconsciously – will be confronted with. That is, why this narrative and not another?
[SF] is not mimetic of the real world. Central to SF is the idea as dynamism. Events evolve out of an idea 
impacting on living creatures and their society. The idea must always be a novelty. This is the core issue of 
SF, even bad SF. That events accord with known scientific truths distinguishes SF from fantasy...The function 
of SF psychologically is to cut the reader loose from the actual world that he inhabits; it deconstructs time, 
space, reality.4
Ironically, it was in his resort to generic fiction that Dick found himself liberated from the relative constraint of writing 
mainstream contemporary fiction to explore instead the furthest reaches of his conceptual imagination. Equally evident are the 
contradictions in Dick's thinking:  'the idea must always be a novelty,' but 'events should accord with known scientific truths';  
'SF is not mimetic of the real world' – but surely if its 'function' is to 'cut the reader loose from the actual world that he 
inhabits,' to deconstruct 'time, space, reality,' the rule is as necessary as the exceptional? Distinguishable here is a further 
question that really underlies and presupposes those two others already mentioned: what is the relation, if any, between idea 
and thing?  Putting things in this way is to make another connection between Dick's literary aspirations and their science 
fictional reality in that what became increasingly evident in his writing was a preoccupation with worldview as social reality;  
the possibility that a choice of any particular narrative organisation is a meaning chosen for us, determined by the particular 
worldview(s) to which our community – or those who exercise power within it – currently subscribes. However, more 
fundamental than this was his concern with the very phenomena of reality that, far from providing any sure basis on which we 
are able to depend, are likewise shifting and obscure. In contrast to an absolute relativism Dick, as is implied above, was most 
often inclined to express a belief in the existence of an absolute reality (of one kind or another). His real difficulty was 
establishing any basis upon which to form a relationship with it. 
In college I was given Plato to read and thereupon became aware of the possible existence of a metaphysical 
realm beyond or above the sensory world. I came to understand that the human mind could conceive of a 
realm of which the empirical world was epiphenomenal. Finally I came to believe that in a certain sense the 
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empirical world was not truly real, at least not as real as the archetypal realm beyond it. At this point I 
despaired of the veracity of sense data. Hence in novel after novel that I write I question the reality of the 
world that the characters' percept-systems report.5
Dick was also to characterise the 'core' of his writing as 'not art but truth.' However, he goes on to qualify this –
Thus what I tell is the truth, yet I can do nothing to alleviate it, either by deed or explanation.6
It seems that in tracing the distinction Kant made between the empirical and the transcendental, between a phenomenon and 
the idea of its necessary conditions of existence, Dick was unable to escape the sense that this situation presented him with a 
world from which he was ineluctably estranged. 
From the Kantian point of view, it is not just that we do not, as a matter of fact, know what lies beyond the 
range of our sense-perception, and those postulated ideas (such as cause and effect, and so on) which we 
must employ to make sense of it in our minds: Kant had argued that in the nature of things we never can 
know.7
Often, in discussions of Dick's work, observations about the results of this situation are linked to his personal difficulties. 
Accounts of these often include the early death of his twin sister, his absent father and difficult relationship with his mother, 
the early onset of various phobias and psychological disorders together with the attendant psychiatric or psychotherapeutic 
treatment (beginning in early adolescence, he would return to this kind of therapy intermittently over the course of his life), a  
series of breakdowns, failed marriages, substance addiction, and his encounter with 'Valis.' In what follows it is not my 
intention to dwell on details of biography although, to begin with, I think it useful to draw attention to these experiences now in 
order to clarify the way in which the narratives I will later discuss are grounded in Dick's life – 'the actual world that he 
inhabited.' This is not to say that what takes place in his novels and stories can be explained away by simply making such a link.  
Although the temptation to find the grounds for those wild and unpredictable narratives in his long-term use of amphetamines 
and other drugs, in his 'madness,' or in his visionary experiences of 1974, has proven too much for many journalists (and likely 
a few critics) this is a little like adding, by way of attempted explanation, another world in our own thoughts about Dick to the 
ones we find pictured for us in his fiction. Such a situation is itself represented in Dick's writing, in particular his work of the 
middle sixties, with its preoccupation with schizophrenia and autism, a culmination of that early insight by which he understood 
each of us to be confined to our own reality, the means of any real intimacy or mutual recognition fundamentally impaired. This 
kind of 'social empiricism' may help us to describe and diagnose the difficulties that were manifest in Dick's life but such a 
detached point of view can in itself bring us no closer to forming an understanding of how such realities arise, to produce for 
us a sense of their meaning. This, after all, was Dick's own motivation. 
Instead, the way I have chosen to approach Dick's work is to, as he himself suggested, begin with the idea. If it is true that 
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'events evolve out of an idea impacting on living creatures and their society,' perhaps it is more useful to reverse the 
proposition of understanding Dick by what he did and was done to him, and look instead for the 'accepted framework of ideas' 
with which he worked and against which he struggled. In this way I have found a subject matching the reflection mirrored in the 
social and personal relations, the philosophical enigmas with which he constructed his narratives. The social alienation he 
characterised in his accounts of failed relationships were also dramatised as mental disorder, and these accounts of 
estrangement, whether one from another or one from all, are inextricably linked with the Kantian riddle already referred to.  
This itself was, in an adapted form, also his social reality and one of those 'meanings chosen for him,' implicit in the standards 
of his day. Essentially, in his efforts to legitimate human knowledge by establishing some kind of reliable connection between 
subject and object, Kant had imposed a whole series of dualisms and oppositions that, to his way of thinking, had liberated the 
programme of human knowledge by revealing the boundaries of the knowable. Kant had denied the earlier assertion of 
empiricism that knowledge is the accumulated impression of sense experience; for him the burden of a world experienced like 
this was not possible to bear, describing instead the way in which sense experience was necessarily filtered in order for any 
sort of intelligibility to be realised at all. However, the 'mental picture' which arises from this process, interposing itself  
between the 'thing-in-itself' and the subject, can never itself give us the world – only represent it to us:
[Such a view] believes us to be so organised that we can experience only the changes of our own selves, but 
not the things-in-themselves that cause these changes. This view concludes from the fact that I know only 
my mental pictures, not that there is no reality independent of them, but only that the subject cannot 
directly assimilate such reality.8
From out of this philosophical problem arise a great many of Dick's complex and often startling narrative migrations dealing 
with appearance and reality, mediation, and necessity or control. Beginning with this idea, it is possible to find in Dick its 
realisation in every kind of social connection and condition and, I argue, each of these can be traced back to the assumption 
implicit in Kant's thinking, that of detachment. Whether beginning with the idea of a solipsistic isolation, or the 'joint' 
hallucination of the world, whether engaging in a narrative comparison of competing philosophical and ideological systems or 
describing the exigencies of a single romantic relationship Dick, like Kant, was presupposing a latent perspective of 
detachment. Whether socially marginal or existentially estranged, Dick's stance is 'that of a perpetual alien, inwardly separated 
from the world in which he acts'9: he sees the truth of things yet 'can do nothing to alleviate it, either by deed or explanation.' 
Looking at Dick's thinking in this way I have drawn extensively on the work of the scientist and philosopher Rudolf Steiner.  
Working in these fields during the last decades of the nineteenth century, Steiner was confronted by an orthodoxy in each that 
largely relied upon the same kinds of presuppositions that Dick, some sixty or seventy years later, would encounter in the 
worldview familiar to him. Steiner, like Dick, can also claim for his life's work a representative and twofold question. First, 'is it  
possible to know reality?' and, second, 'are we free?'10 To Steiner these questions were two parts of a single proposition (as I 
will later claim of Dick's own questions) to which, in a sense, we ourselves were the solution. His early preoccupation with 
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Kantian metaphysics was for Steiner an initial phase of what was a gradual and life-long process of engagement with the limits 
that had been placed upon knowledge and freedom. What we find a record of in Dick's writing (nowhere more so than in the 
extensive personal journal he kept, his Exegesis) is in Steiner specifically nominated as the pivot of his philosophical 
conception: the thinking activity. In a similar fashion to Wittgenstein's demonstration that the necessary conceptual boundaries 
that Kant supposes can only be established internally (never permitting the proof of that apparently unknown reality beyond 
that these require11), Steiner turns Kant's assertion around, pointing out that in the very act of ascribing these limits to human 
knowledge 'we find the faculties to transcend them.'12 For Dick, I will argue, that desire 'to cut the reader loose' from 'time and 
space' is a figure for his struggle with a reality standard for which these are the basic attributes. For Steiner, this wrestling 
with reality is in fact an encounter with our own presuppositions about reality. In Kant's case he has 
taken over from the 'naïve' model the notion that the observer is ultimately other than the world he 
observes. That is why the problem reappears again after being displaced into the imaginary realm of things-
in-themselves.13 
Thinking is instead free from any theoretical limitation and neither the 'dogma of revelation' – where truths are passed down 
'about things that are withheld from our view,' having oneself 'no insight into the world from which the postulates arise' 14 – nor 
any dogma of a positivistic empiricism that would claim for the description of natural processes a solution to the observing 
consciousness, are able to authorise a view of reality consistent with this insight. 
Steiner's concern with these problems parallels Dick's own. He understood, as Dick was to powerfully and often grotesquely 
illustrate in his fiction, that our worldview is not simply instrumental – as if we somehow stand outside of it – but that it is an 
interpretive activity not only evident in its productions but productive of its evidence, a world created no more in God's image 
than in science's but rather, in our own. As Gertrude Reif Hughes describes it,
Rudolf Steiner’s study of human freedom is really a study of human ways of knowing. Steiner made 
knowledge a key to freedom and individual responsibility, because he discovered that the processes of 
cognition, which he usually just called 'thinking,' share an essential quality with the essence of selfhood or 
individuality: each could, in some sense, know itself.15
Rejecting the idea of reality as essentially located outside our thinking, our ideas nothing more than a reflection of what exists 
without us, Steiner sees knowing as fundamentally creative of something completely new – the world in its fullest sense. 'In 
thinking,' he writes, 'the ground of being shows itself in its most perfect form.' Existence, essentially conceived, is to be found 
within thinking. In reading Dick, I have drawn attention to the recurring figure of an inconsequential and pathetic subjectivity 
that is later transformed by means of a changed relationship to the world (or, to the prevailing condition of power relations).  
Dick's narratives, containing both the subject and their world, are both the agent and object of change and, in this way, 
represent in fiction what Steiner articulates in his philosophy. 
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Thinking, or cognition, in Steiner's terms, can be conceived in a similar way to our use of terms like 'world' or 'word' to 
designate some common factor in which neither subject or object is the determining principle, indicating instead a field of 
activity that, necessarily, is neither one nor the other. It is this quality that enables what Steiner identifies as the 'special 
characteristic of thinking,' that it is able to observe itself. This, as Reif Hughes describes,
is an exceptional case of knowing in the same way that the pronoun, 'I,' is an exceptional case of pronoun 
reference. Just as 'I' always refers to the sayer of 'I' and to no one else, so, in the special case when 
thinking notices itself instead of anything else, observer and observed are identical. 16
Present within our own thinking activity is not only the ability to recognise itself but, likewise, the capacity to acknowledge the 
selves of others. As Owen Barfield has observed, 'the paradox of individuality (it is my act) and universality (it is  
superindividual)'  17 that is inherent in thinking is also the root of an actual I-Thou relation between individuals. It is in this 
paradoxical sense that Steiner names thinking as a manifestation of 'essential existence' which, to the extent that both I and 
Thou participate in it, constitutes a reality including both our separate identities and the possibility of their mutual existence. 
Relationship is at the heart of Steiner's philosophy, not as it imposes upon the circumstances of conceptual or personal 
conditions, but in the processes it identifies as constitutive of human experience. 
To begin with, through our active and independent efforts to think, we create a free space. The first activity 
of thought 'prepares the appearance of thinking.'18
Knowledge here is the fruit of 'an encounter between our own activity and the world's essential being, appearing, therefore, 
only in 'relation to the human being.' On the other hand, my reading of Dick is interested in exploring the frustration of his  
encounters with 'otherness,' which I see as an insoluble problem in terms of the system of enquiry he has inherited. This  
system, as I have described, relegates our knowledge to a world apart, thereby raising the question of whether or not the 
inevitably indirect inferences we make about it (i.e., those based on our ordinary experience) bear any relation to that reality. 
Therefore, Steiner writes that
Those who hold this point of view are concerned not with the inner connection of their conscious percepts 
but only with the non-conscious causes of those percepts.19
Arising from this situation is what I claim to be the single problem present in each of Dick's questions – both the reality of the 
subject himself and the world which he finds around him are jeopardised. This is implicit in Steiner's 'first observation' about 
thinking, 'that it is the unobserved element in our ordinary mental and spiritual life.'20 For, if as he claims, 'the I is to be found in 
thinking,' and in thinking essential existence, then in the failure to account for our contribution to the world we risk the reality 
of our presence in it. 
However, as I have attempted to show, the idea is not content with its situation in the abstract; its influence is unqualified, 
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manifest equally in Dick's vision of the politics, economics, technology, and society in and with which he lived. As will later be 
discussed, he harbours an often paranoid (if not unjustified) concern over its presence wherever power is exercised, not least 
of all in language and its use in writing –  including his own. In calling his philosophy 'spiritual,' Steiner was recognising this  
same catholic quality in the idea and the concept, the products of thinking, the inner reality of the world. In describing his 
epistemological and moral philosophy as 'ethical individualism' he was providing in general terms what his thinking had sought 
to address at each point. In trying 'to present a view of the human being that can support all other knowledge' Steiner wants to 
claim for his positive assessment of cognition a means for realising freedom. Dick, with his bleak and encompassing 
imagination of what he called the Black Iron Prison – essentially a figure for the ideological and conceptual assumptions I have 
been discussing – is, for his part, desperately seeking his own path to the same end. Through the kind of realistic account of 
the world that can only be realised imaginatively, Dick demonstrates in fiction after fiction the mercilessly logical necessity 
that the authority or truth standard of the novel or story in question is imposing upon its inhabitants. For Steiner, as perhaps it 
was for Dick, the individual's counterpart in the world is not 'society' but the 'genus' or 'type.' For Kant the thing-in-itself of his  
moral and ethical philosophy was the rational ideal of a given action's basis in a principle valid for everyone – the concept of  
'duty.' This is the imperative that Steiner called the 'death to all individual impulses of action.'21 
After all, if moral significance attaches to the generalised principle, to the 'What if everyone...' element in the 
formula, the specific case, the moral act, is stripped of its ethical reality – which inheres rather in 
reflection, conscience, the awareness of good intentions or guilt.22
But this is precisely the kind of external authority that both Steiner and Dick were concerned to deal with. For Steiner the 
questions of knowledge and freedom were bound to one another for just this reason. In The Philosophy of Freedom the motive 
for action, if it is to be free, will be chosen at each opportunity by that same insight that grants us consciousness of our own 
thinking process. Steiner calls this 'intuition,' 'the conscious experience, within what is purely spiritual, of a purely spiritual 
content.'23 That is, the basis of our actions – our motives – need not be established for us in advance, or through reference to 
any standard apart from our own 'unmediated and directly knowable' intuitive awareness. Through the course of Dick's 
'metanovel' (as he would, in later life, refer to a large part of his work24), with its ineluctable Black Iron Prison, the beleaguered 
protagonists who suffer frequently the threat of effacement by the law of this society or that worldview, would surely be glad 
of such a freedom. 
Though I've begun by making a sketch of Kant's influence upon both Dick and Steiner, the point has not been to limit their 
search for the identity of the human being and the nature of reality in terms of a response to the perceived impositions that 
Kant's philosophy represents. Rather, through reference to one particularly important instance, my intention has been to 
characterise the profound way that such a privileged discourse gets 'under the skin.' Andrew Welburn, describing Steiner's 
engagement with Kant, also indicates a more general situation evident in conventional conceptions of knowledge – 
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Steiner's technique is, as always, to get to the bottom of the philosophical enterprise, and to uncover the 
assumptions, the particular perspective, on which it is based. In this sense he is not hostile to Kant or out to 
catch him in a failure of logical deduction, but sets out to reveal the particular limited way in which Kant is 
true – so as also to expose the way in which we are liable to become fixated, stuck in a way of thinking 
instead of responding creatively to different cognitive situations when they arise. In reality, the illegitimate 
extension of ways of thought become a straightjacket on the thinker, beyond which is only the intrinsically 
unknowable, rather serving to displace the problems of knowledge instead of solving them. And because he 
stakes everything on the claim to know the only valid ways of thinking, the Kantian thinker is particularly 
prone to such illusions.25
Steiner is interested to converse with Kant on his own terms and, in addition to what Welburn outlines above, this means, 
simply, sharing a common philosophical discourse. Dick, on the other hand, for all his philosophical intent, is a writer of science 
fiction. However, this proves I think, something of an advantage to him and, in my reading of Dick, becomes the means by which 
he is able to overcome a closed system of knowledge and its ramifications for the subject and his reality. For example, the 
many 'fakes' of Dick's fiction are images, in a sense, of identities (or, ideas) uprooted and relocated from their concrete 
historical contexts to best serve a particular ideological perspective, making of identity something metaphysical and suspect. 
Androids too (whether mechanical or biological) are representative figures in Dick, 'types' bound by the law of their nature 
(biological, psychological, societal, technological etc.), incapable of the empathy or willingness to make exceptions that Dick 
recognised as essentially human qualities. Dick, who considered himself a 'fictionalising philosopher,' eschewed the discursive 
and rational conventions of philosophy, representing his thinking in the tropes and metaphors of his stories, which both 
diminishes the risk of their adoption as any kind of final solution and, crucially, foregrounds the necessary interpretive activity 
through which their meanings emerge. This was as true for Dick as it might be for any other interpreter; he frequently re-read 
his own work for news of their evolving message. In effect, this is the single solution that I see him indicating with the polarity 
he set up through, on the one hand, those two questions of his and, on the other, the response he articulates to these in his 
work. 
We have already looked at Dick in the context of the visionary and seen how the struggle to create his own meaning brought 
him into conflict with the accepted framework of reality. Along the way he experimented with both personal and public fantasy 
(solipsistic and joint hallucination), finding in neither a firm ground for his narrative devices. In an irony that Archimedes might 
have appreciated, Dick found himself able to lever with these devices the cosmos from its hinges just because of their lack of 
any sure support. The meaning in life that narrative is expected to embody instead teetered dangerously for him on the brink of 
an abyss, of 'irreason' and chaos. Resigning, at his lowest ebb, the hope of ever finding a 'commonsense' within himself or the 
world he gave up, for a time, on his search. The record of what persisted is, however, at least as explicit in his fiction as it is in 
those accounts we have of his life. We know from reading Dick that the value of our capacity to empathise remained 
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undiminished for him. Increasingly fundamental to his situation in the world was Christ's recension of the Decalogue in John's 
gospel, 'This I command you, to love one another.' Some have interpreted the time following his experiences of 1974, during 
which his study of mysticism and religion was intensified, as a retreat into a metaphysics of revelation. Reading the novels he 
published after 1974 or the published extracts of his great journal, the Exegesis, it is certainly possible to arrive at such a 
conclusion. Dick himself remained undecided about what to make of these events, at least in any conclusive fashion. In what 
follows, my reading of his later work will prove somewhat similar to his own; both of us see his novel Valis, the most explicit 
fictional account of his '2-3-74' experiences, as providing a guide to his work as a whole. I also see in Valis a convergence of 
Dick's epistemological speculation and his Christology, an evolution of his consolation in Christ's injunction to his disciples by 
which those philosophical questions are resurrected as imaginative truth. 
'The apprehension of polarity,' wrote Owen Barfield, 'is itself the basic act of imagination.'26 This is a juncture at which Barfield 
calls on his reader 'not to think about imagination, but to use it.' I will argue that the use to which Dick was putting his  
imagination is pictured for us most clearly in Valis. Just as we earlier saw in Steiner the 'first activity of thought' as a creation 
of 'free space' in which it may then appear, in Valis we have a special instance of the 'third person,' a manifestation neither 
subjective or objective. Again, this is Dick the science fiction writer, figuring for us something similar to what Steiner has 
described discursively. Just as I will argue that the generic standard of knowledge and identity in A Scanner Darkly (together 
with the attempt by its powers to claim for this standard an existence independent of us) is overturned by the loving 
recognition of other selves so, in Valis, is self-consciousness emergent as the field in which every binary is present. The world, 
or reality, and the human being are each realised by the imaginative act, and objectivity is recast – no longer as a standpoint 
we adopt to determine the truth, but instead the way in which we recognise our own knowing relationship with the world. Out of  
the intrinsic contradictions of human existence, the alienation of idea and thing, the inevitable separation from which we gain 
our individuality no less than the freedom to meet the world and one another, is realised the Logos,  emerging from that 
'encounter between our own activity and the world's essential being' as a confirmation of their common ground. For Philip K. 
Dick, I argue, the images he furnished us with are not to be identified with the truths which for him, at times, they represented,  
but realised by the reader as no more than the means for further enquiry. 
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HE FELT ALL AT ONCE LIKE AN INEFFECTUAL MOTH, FLUTTERING AT THE WINDOWPANE OF REALITY, DIMLY SEEING IT FROM THE  
OUTSIDE. 
PHILIP K. DICK, UBIK
HUMAN BEINGS DIE BECAUSE THEY CANNOT JOIN THEIR BEGINNING AND THEIR END.  
ALCMAEON OF CROTON
BERKELEY: THE UNIVERSE IS AN IDEA IN THE MIND OF GOD. I ALTER THAT TO "THE UNIVERSE IS AN IDEA IN THE MINDS OF MEN." 
PHILIP K. DICK
In his novel Ubik, Philip K. Dick articulates what could be considered the foremost conceptual influence on his fictional and 
theoretical narratives. In an interview conducted in 1976 he expressed it in the following terms: “I think that, like in my writing,  
reality is always a soap bubble, Silly Putty thing anyway. In the universe people are in, people put their hands through the walls,  
and it turns out they're living in another century entirely...I often have the feeling – and it does show up in my books – that this  
is all just a stage.” This questioning, perhaps sceptical, attitude toward reality or, more particularly, appearances, provides 
much of the dynamic tension in Dick's stories and novels. The distinction between appearance and reality, far from being 
unique to Philip K. Dick, has been of concern to Western thought in one guise or another at least since the time of Plato and 
Aristotle. However, since Descartes's attempt, at the dawn of the so-called 'Age of Reason,' to respond to the emergent 
question of the relationship between body and soul, the diminishing confidence in any providential guarantee has rendered 
inadmissible what he himself was still able to take for granted: that the right relationship between my mind and the world 
outside of it is ultimately insured by the beneficence of the creator as manifest in the harmonious order of His creation. In this 
description of the agents active in Descartes's epistemological picture it becomes possible to distinguish the ramifications for 
science in the course of its emergence from theology:
...once the role of God is weakened, then the idea in the mind and that which it purports to represent fall 
apart into the dichotomy of the so-called Cartesian dualism...It is from this that the famous problem of 
knowledge arises, i.e., the question: How can we be certain that a representation (idea) in consciousness 
corresponds to what is there “outside” of consciousness? How can we bridge the gulf between 
representation and reality? This “problem of knowledge” arises automatically from the Cartesian position 
once we cease to rely on God to guarantee things for us. Heidegger recognised that the problem of 
knowledge, i.e., epistemology, is really the metaphysics of knowledge.1
Such a tenuous dichotomy and the conceptual relations it engendered were familiar to Dick, who was well aware of the 
epistemological pessimism of thinkers subsequent to Descartes such as Hume and Kant, developing many of his plots in light of 
just such an uncertainty. Given the presence of these influences in Dick's work it is useful to attend to the subtle way in which, 
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through the thinking of such ideas, we are extruded from the world about which we speculate, as if ideas arise about its nature 
and our relationship with it only in order to disqualify the thinker and his thoughts from any claim to the involvement these 
same ideas might otherwise imply. Perhaps, if it were not for the inherited epistemological standard that understands 'real'  
and 'ideal' as categorically exclusive, this situation might provoke more widespread reflection. Of course, this observation 
itself could be characterised on a linguistic level as succumbing to the same presuppositions evident in the idea it is intended 
to criticise (e.g., “the world about which we speculate...the thinker and his thoughts” etc.). Such a regress is a picture of how 
thoroughly a world view may engage us both conceptually and linguistically, being also an effective analogue of both Ubik 
specifically and Dick's typical characterisation of an ineluctable reality (witness his oft quoted aphorism, 'Reality is that which, 
when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away')2. In considering the philosophical implications of Dick's work, such observations 
may go some way in accounting for the tension Dick identifies – and with which at times he may be identified – in both the 
dualist and empirical world views his thinking is engaged with. 
One possible example of the influence which such world views exert may be drawn from the fundamentals of logic. Specifically,  
the Aristotelian logic which conventional thought presupposes. This is a modality in which it is impossible for a thing to both be 
and not be at once (non-contradiction); rather, it must have a single identity, being either one or the other, a necessary 
condition (excluded middle) of establishing a basis for any logical conclusion. These three principles were recognised by Hegel 
as really three aspects of one law (any one implying the other two), a law – in light of a recognition that distinction and relation 
are necessarily associated – that he saw as relative rather than absolute.3 Henri Bergson observed that a rigid adherence to 
these principles amounted to a 'logic of solid bodies,' 'since it is in the world of such bodies that separation is the predominant 
feature.'4 It was Kant who had earlier claimed otherwise, describing such a logic as a 'science a priori of the necessary laws of 
thinking not, however, in respect of particular objects but all objects in general...a science therefore of the right use of  
understanding and reason as such, not subjectively, i.e., not according to empirical principles of how the understanding thinks, 
but objectively, i.e., according to a priori principles of how it ought to think.'5 Given a partitioning of reality so fundamentally 
conceived, and so universal in influence, it should come as no surprise that Dick, in confronting a world on these terms, 
struggled so mightily – and not always successfully – with finding, or forging, a conceptual language with which to articulate 
the doubts he found growing up through the cracks in this philosophy. As we shall see, Dick recognised this a priori  standard 
as a challenge to human freedom, finding it necessary to circumvent such an epistemological hegemony through a resort to 
contradiction, conflations of identity, and paradox. 
In Ubik such a grappling with reality is centrally positioned and neatly entwined with Dick's own role as writer and demiurge of 
a world of his own creation. At the conclusion of the novel's penultimate chapter one of the story's protagonists, Joe Chip, 
reflects with gratitude on the guidance of his boss, Glen Runciter, 
The writer of instructions, labels and notes. Valuable notes. [206]
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Immediately following, in the novel's final, elliptical chapter, told this time from the perspective of Runciter himself, Dick 
proceeds to undermine the apparently authoritative position from which Runciter had been issuing his instructions by casting 
into doubt both Runciter's own reality standard as well as the carefully developed logic of the story that Dick himself has 
devised. Any awareness of Dick's life and work may coincide here with the sense that, as author, Dick is once more writing 
himself into the narrative. In Ubik, as in all but the bleakest of his fictions, Dick presents language as possessing the capacity 
for communication between, at times, not only one consciousness and another, but between one world and the next; the 
presence of the Logos in Dick's work, as far as this is considered a source of meaning rather than a communication of bare 
information alone, is one of boundary bridging agent to which he returns time and again. For how else, should the worst 
forecasts of the various existential metaphysics prove true, are we to overcome this isolation? However, as we have already 
seen, the intention and its object may themselves be at odds. Dick's narratives manifest this insight as a deep-seated and 
characteristic irony. 
As an important element of his thinking, these references to language were not limited to his fictional work alone: 
The basic tool for the manipulation of reality is the manipulation of words. If you can control the meaning of 
words, you can control the people who must use the words.6
Of significance here is the relation Dick identifies between agency and language. However, the explicit references to language 
and communication aside, this passage contains several other important indications not only in connection with Dick's 
epistemological concerns, but also as they bear upon his thinking considered as a whole. His use in this context of the words 
'manipulation' and 'control' in relation to 'reality' and 'people' demonstrate his understanding of how readily we can become a 
thrall to not only what we know but how we know it. Indeed, I claim in what follows that Dick has inherited a world view prizing 
knowledge as a 'tool' or instrument (Francis Bacon's Novum Organum may be considered something of a manifesto in this 
regard), with its objects of knowledge, ideally, as subject to this manipulation and control. And while this passage alludes to 
concerns regarding ideology and indoctrination, social identity and freedom, of particular interest is the executive inclination 
implicit in the connection of these themes. In kind with the 'regress' I mentioned above, it may be possible to see here the way 
in which the phrasing of Dick's concerns and objections bear the impression of those concerning and objectionable qualities 
with which he is contending. Pragmatically or, perhaps, pessimistically, Dick was aware of what was at stake in a frank 
assessment of knowledge and its grounds. His frequent representations of the problem of mediation, whether psychological,  
social, political, or technological, allude to the uncertainty he felt regarding the possibility of a 'staged' reality. Just as Kant 
believed that our conceptual grasp of the world was determined by necessary conditions of sensibility or, as the quote above 
reflects, the view that social reality is driven by a detached and instrumental use of not only language but the social actors 
who must use it and the meanings with which it is imbued, so every world view is of potentially universal significance and bears 
equally upon questions of knowledge and freedom in the most fundamental way. 
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In clarifying the terms of his own epistemological observations the physicist and philosopher Henri Bortoft makes the following 
observation:
The point here is that the relation is intrinsic to the act of distinguishing, and not an external connection 
between separate “somethings” which have already been distinguished. This means that the relation is a 
necessary relation, and not contingent, as it would be if it were an external connection.7
That this is not usually noticed, Bortoft writes, is due to a failure 'to catch distinguishing in the act.' Were we to do so, he 
suggests, we might notice, instead of what is distinguished, that the primary distinguishing (the act, rather than its object) is at 
the same time a relating, each of these being poles of a single axis which, taken as a whole, comprise the 'organising idea' of 
phenomena. Rudolf Steiner, in his seminal philosophical work, The Philosophy of Freedom, wrote that 'Thinking must never be 
regarded as a merely subjective activity. Thinking is beyond subject and object, it forms both of these concepts, as it does all 
others.'8 To this way of understanding, the grounds of reality are to be found within the cognitive process, in no way existing 
independently and antecedent to cognitive perception as might be expected from a subject–object dualism. Bortoft employs 
the sentence 'I see a tree' to show how the linguistic construction suggests that there is 'an I-entity and a tree-entity which 
first exist by themselves, separate from and independent of each other, which are then subsequently joined together (albeit in 
an external way) by the intermediate link “see.”'9 According to Bortoft, the mistaken belief to be found here is that there is an 
'I-entity' anterior to cognition when in fact, as Steiner had earlier described, 10 'ego-consciousness' is itself a derivative of the 
process of cognitive perception. Both subject and object are secondary but are, by way of their origin in the cognitive process, 
united in the kind of polarity mentioned above. This is clearly a related but quite differently grounded picture of knowledge to 
the one which we find in Dick. What may be observed is the way in which a conception of language is expanded to include an 
account of the processes productive of language itself. Significantly we find ourselves included in these 'processes,' indeed, as 
their authors, rather than instruments organised only to fulfil their function. 
Of central importance here is the recognition that ideas which we may form about the world are at once a part of that same 
world. Those contrasting conceptions of Descartes with which I began were in turn inspired by the even older Platonic stream. 
Derived from a reading of Plato that takes his philosophy to describe an absolute split between the 'intelligible' world of Forms 
– the pure idea or 'first' type 'behind' phenomena – and the 'sensible' world of nature, interpreted as appearance only, lacking 
the substantial essence of its Form, such world views present a dualistic cosmology from which the problem of epistemology 
inevitably follows. Rudolf Steiner's account of Plato differs in a similar way to which his account of knowledge differs from any 
metaphysic, ancient or modern. In an early work11 Steiner describes Plato's 'two-world theory' as arising from the way he 
presented 'the relation between idea and sense experience.'12 Rather than reading Plato as describing an absolute breach 
between the intelligible and sensory Steiner understands him to mean that without the informing idea sensory phenomena can 
be no more than a semblance. This indicates the relationship of idea and object in Steiner's own thinking. To Steiner's 
conception the world is necessarily sundered by the human organisation. By way of perception the awareness of one's own self  
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as definitely bounded and relative to other perceptual phenomena is established, while the relationship and common origin of 
these entities arise conceptually, the cognitive process 'beyond subject and object' is the common element in which percept 
and concept are joined. 'It is due...to our organisation that the full, complete reality, including our own selves as subjects, 
appears at first as a duality.' In contrast to the dualistic impasse sketched above, Steiner refers to his own epistemology as of 
a monist variety:
Let us call the manner in which the world presents itself to us, before it has taken on its true nature through 
our knowing it, “the world of appearance,” in contrast to the unified whole composed of percept and 
concept. We can then say: The world is given to us as a duality, and knowledge transforms it into a unity...
[dualism] does not assume just that there are two sides of a single reality which are kept apart by our 
organisation, but that there are two worlds absolutely distinct from one another. It then tries to find in one 
of these two worlds the principles for the explanation of the other.13
Ubik's protagonist, Joe Chip, is a technician for Glen Runciter's prudence organisation, Runciter & Associates. The novel opens 
with a dateline of June 5th 1992, New York City. As the story develops the reader learns that Runciter's 'prudence 
establishment' is an agency able to offer protection from the thought crime that has emerged in the wake of the development 
of psychic abilities, or 'psionics,' in a segment of the population . In addition there has clearly been a rapid development of 
technology enabling private travel to the Moon or Luna, as it is known, and the cryonic suspension of individuals near death in 
which they retain limited consciousness and communication ability; this state is known as 'half-life.' When Runciter & 
Associates are engaged by 'speculator and financier' Stanton Mick to secure his facility on Luna from suspected psychic 
invasion Runciter assembles a group of eleven 'anti-psis' together with technician Joe Chip for the mission. However, upon 
arriving on Luna, the group of twelve plus Runciter himself discover that the job is in fact a trap. A bomb explodes and Runciter 
is mortally wounded, leaving Joe and the others to retreat to their spacecraft and on to Earth in order to commit him to half-
life at the same facility in Switzerland in which his wife Ella is already interred. Following this calamity on Luna events begin to 
dictate increasingly contingent expectations of reality. The deterioration of various foods and cigarettes, and the 
transformation of coins into older forms of themselves are among the first signs that something has gone very much awry. By 
the time Runciter begins to appear on currency in place of the ordinary dead president, messages from him are found among 
graffiti on bathroom walls, and he appears to Joe Chip in a televised visitation, the agents of Runciter & Associates are 
speculating in all urgency as to what is taking place. These messages indicate that the agents themselves are the ones in half-
life while Runciter remains alive on the “outside.” As it slowly dawns on the characters that time itself is moving inexorably 
backward, into the past, Runciter's communications begin to emphasise a protean-like consumable, 'Ubik.' In fact each chapter 
of the book begins with an epigraph in the form of a Ubik advertising slogan which establishes the idea of a kind of 'ubiquitous' 
consumer brand connected with an array of products, each designated by the same name. As the story reaches its climax, the 
time slip is arrested in the year 1939, and Joe Chip's suspicions are confirmed when Runciter manifests himself in the now 
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pre-war era telling Joe that he was the only survivor of the blast on Luna, that Joe and the others are dead, and that his 
messages to the group have been attempts to communicate with them in half-life. Shortly after, Jorry Miller is revealed as the 
source not only of the time slip but the deaths of Joe's fellow agents over the course of their time in half-life. Members of Joe's  
group have perished one by one due to what appears to be an accelerated ageing and decomposition process, succumbing as 
they wander off from the others, to be found only after the process has run its course. Jorry, another half-lifer whom Runciter 
had briefly encountered earlier in the story while communicating with his wife Ella, has been consuming the life force of his  
fellow internees in order to lengthen his own 'half-lifespan' indefinitely. Having been delivered a life-saving dose of Ubik by 
Runciter and thereby finding himself temporarily inoculated against Jorry's life-devouring activity Joe Chip, in conversation 
with Jorry, is told that the entire retrograde world is a creation of Jorry's mind fabricated for the sole purpose of devouring 
the members of Joe's group. The story leaves Joe in a standoff with Jorry having, through Ella Runciter, found a line of supply 
to further quantities of Ubik, but remaining trapped for the time being in a world of Jorry's devising. Finally, this lack of a 
conclusive resolution is confirmed when Runciter, though apparently in the world of the living, discovers that several coins in  
his possession bear the profile of his erstwhile technician, Joe Chip. 
Readers of Dick will be readily familiar with his enigmatic ambiguity. In common with so many of his fictions, Ubik outlines a 
circular indeterminacy that fails to square with any possible expectation of a neatly composed and conclusive final act. Instead, 
taken as a whole, the story appears to hindsight as a kind of hieroglyphic picture of both conceptual dilemma and the narrative 
contour of the novel itself. Runciter's early and almost premonitory intimation may well ultimately reflect the reader's own 
impression: 
...he felt unhappy cravings arise, cloudy and pointless wants that led nowhere, that returned to him empty, 
as in the completion of a geometrically perfect circle. [43]
Nonetheless, as a representation of Dick's suspicion of reality as somehow staged, a façade, Ubik can be judged a success. At 
every turn the author fabricates further and unexpected complications, from the narrative-bending alternate realities of the 
parapsychologically talented Pat Conley, to the purgatorial ambiguities of half-life, to the very ontological status of the 
characters themselves,
I'll zip over to my conapt, he decided, pick up the free sample of Ubik, then head for Des Moines. After all, 
that's what the TV Commercial urged me to do. I'll be safer carrying a can of Ubik with me, as the ad pointed 
out in its own jingly, clever way. One has to pay attention to such admonitions, he realised, if one expects to 
stay alive – or half-alive. Whichever it is. [125]
As we have seen, none of these diversions are ultimately telling and indeed, if further confirmation of Runciter's 'unhappy 
cravings' were required, we arrive at the novel's final sentence only to read, 'This was just the beginning.' Even the conclusion 
is something of a narrative deception. 
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Given the nature of the discussion so far it should be unsurprising that Dick's Exegesis should contain the following self-
reflection:
I am a fictionalizing philosopher, not a novelist; my novel and story-writing ability is employed as a means to 
formulate my perception.14
As a philosopher employing fiction 'as a means to formulate [his] perception' I see Dick's philosophy as being distinguished by a 
frequent uncertainty and distrust of thinking. In the context of the dialectical struggle between mind and matter this can leave 
his reader with the sense of having stepped into an empty elevator shaft. In his worst moments Dick's ambivalence is general;  
he demonstrates an inability to trust either the evidence of his senses or the workings of his mind, leaving him apparently 
unsupported, without grounds for being. His instrumental sense of language is manifest as the suspicion that someone or 
something is tampering with the course of his life. However, what becomes increasingly evident is that the dire end to which 
this cast of mind tends is itself a solution. In the discovery that the nature of the problem is universal, affecting reality as a 
whole, Dick is able to picture a means to bridge the epistemological divide he has inherited. 
Ubik is notable for a number of important allusions to metaphysical thought, including the central development of ideas 
connected with Plato's theory of Forms together with the implication of two distinct worlds: one celestial, spiritual and ideal;  
the other, sublunary, earthly and corruptible, subject to the twin processes of growth and degeneration. This is not at all lost 
on the inhabitants of Ubik's strange landscapes, as we may see when we read of Joe Chip ruminating on 'this old theory...this 
discarded ancient philosophy...Plato's idea objects...The ancient dualism: body separated from soul'  [126-27]. A more recent 
reference to the same problem is given with a character's quotation of Shakespeare's Richard III, and his cursing of this 
“dissembling nature,” his arrival “before my time into this breathing world“ [45]. Throughout, such a separation lingers, 
providing direction from the wings of the drama unfolding centrally. The uneasy and puzzling relationship of mind and matter is  
characterised in all manner of peculiar and surreal narrative fabrications, The juxtaposition, for example, of man and machine 
figures frequently: 
...objective machines geared to react only to physical properties. No psychological elements came into play 
there. Machines could not imagine. [105]
The gulf between the purity of the archetype Man and its all too human counterpart are contrasted in a gesture typical of the 
self-deprecating and dispirited Dickian protagonist: 
It did not seem possible that Wendy Wright had been born out of blood and internal organs like other 
people...Near her he became aware of the physical mechanisms which kept him alive; within him machinery, 
pipes and valves and gas-compressors and fan belts had to chug away at a losing task, a labour ultimately 
doomed...noticing her body made him feel like a low-class wind-up toy...Her eyes...looked impassively at 
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everything; he had never seen fear in them, or aversion, or contempt...she struck him as being durable, 
untroubled and cool, not subject to wear, or to fatigue, or to physical illness and decline...and certainly she 
would never look older. She had too much control over herself and outside reality for that. [55-6]
Equally typical of Dick's playful perversity is the end he proceeds to make for Wendy Wright, who is the first among Joe Chip's 
party to suffer the withering consumption of her life force, in effect the very thing that Joe has imagined her as impervious to. 
In fact, the vicissitudes of Dick's shifting realities are seen as applying equally and in turn to both mind and matter. In the 
figure of Glen Runciter we have the means by which a kind of final statement of Dick's judgement of knowledge and reality may 
be understood. For, as early as the novel's opening chapter, Runciter has been established as a kind of 'master and 
commander,' an imposing articulation of the mind's capacity for subsisting in higher realms:
He chuckled, but it had an abstract quality; he always smiled and he always chuckled, his voice always 
boomed, but inside he did not notice anyone, did not care; it was his body which smiled, nodded and shook 
hands. Nothing touched his mind, which remained remote; aloof, but amiable. [5]
As we have already seen, Runciter's 'perfect circle' is ultimately unsatisfying and inconclusive, his privileged vantage point 
undermined decisively along with the conventions of the medium in which it has been presented, the promise of the intelligible 
and the mindless revealed as equally inadequate in a search for answers.  
Among the Pre-Socratic philosophers most frequently cited by Dick is Heraclitus. Dick's borrowings from him include the idea 
of personal and public worlds or, idios and koinos kosmoi. This idea is a frequent presence in his fiction, clearly appealing as 
grist for his speculations regarding the relationship of subject with object, thinking and appearance. In Ubik it is conspicuous 
as the confusions of identity in half-life mentioned earlier, as well as in the inevitable question arising in regard to the world 
Joe and the agents of Runciter and Associates are told by Jorry is “a product of my mind” [190]. Plato's theory, as a sort of 
axis around which these figures revolve, was equally cognisant of some of the difficulties arising from Heraclitus's thinking. 
Indeed, the most famous of Plato's pupils believed the theory of Forms contained in it a response to Heraclitus's account of the 
mysteries of existence, and the condition of flux through which these, to an extent, become manifest for us.15 A key statement 
of Plato's position in this regard is found in his Cratylus:
But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed; for 
if knowledge itself does not change and cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there 
would be knowledge; but if the very essence of knowledge changes, at the moment of the change to another 
essence of knowledge there would be no knowledge, and if it is always changing, there will always be no 
knowledge, and by this reasoning there will be neither anyone to know nor anything to be known. But if there 
is always that which knows and that which is known — if the beautiful, the good, and all the other verities 
exist — I do not see how there is any likeness between these conditions of which I am now speaking and flux 
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or motion.  [paragraph 440a&b]16
This 'always changing' that Plato identifies as representing a conception of knowledge that must finally consume itself is in 
Ubik, as it is elsewhere in Dick's work, a constant danger to the inhabitants of Dick's pseudo worlds. It seems that, in order to 
overcome the Cartesian problem with which he is wrestling, Dick chooses to circumvent the mind-body split by adopting a 
principle much like Heraclitus's 'always changing' to problematise each equally. This amounts to an inversion of Descartes's 
providential guarantee of a divinely ordered harmony. A reality contingent upon such a thoroughgoing plasticity is indicated 
when Joe Chip finds himself recognising a World War I era biplane by name, realising that 'Elements of this period appear to be 
developing corresponding coordinates in my mind,' and causing him to conclude that, 'I'm beginning to phase mentally with this 
time-continuum in earnest!' [135]. 
With this last insight Joe  appears to take a step beyond narrative allusions alternating between mind ('Parapsychological 
powers,  mental force operating directly, without any intervening physical agency' [141]), and matter ('His world had assumed 
the attribute of pure mass. He perceived himself in one mode only: that of an object subjected to the pressure of weight. One 
quality, one attribute. And one experience. Inertia,' [166]). Instead, what is becoming clearer is the way in which the two 
processes active in the story's unfolding ('There are two forces at work...one helping us and one destroying us' [181]) are each 
of a recognisably cognitive derivation. Both of these 'opposing forces' are seen to be responsible for the shifting and variable 
realities with which the characters must deal. Whether it be the reversion of time and the degenerative, coarsening effect that  
foreshadows Jorry's consumption of another of the character's life force, or the restorative, rejuvenating quality of Ella 
Runciter's 'Ubik' remedy, each influence is seen as both an operative 'idea' and actually effective. Just as the 'elements' of the 
nineteen thirties were found by Joe Chip to be developing 'corresponding coordinates' in his mind, so the entire landscape of  
Ubik is increasingly revealed instead to be a mindscape. 
It seems that an element of the difficulty that Runciter and his Associates experience over the course of the novel may be 
connected to their attachment to various 'objective' measures of reality. The presence, for example, of the parapsychologically 
talented is established by resorting to a 'testing battery' [24], 'thought processes' are 'monitored' [35]; forces are in this way 
'measured' in order to provide 'objective proof' of (psionic) 'talent' and 'counter talent'. In one context we are told that an 
objective and technical 'Medical science...supplies the material groundwork, and out of the authority of his mind Runciter 
supplies the remainder' [8]. As we have previously observed, the supplanting of Runciter's authority has much to do with the 
end to which Dick leads us and it is Runciter's representative kind of knowing specifically that Dick is at pains to demonstrate 
to us as essentially lacking. Referring once again to that circular return of his 'unhappy cravings,' we can see this now as a 
picture of Runciter's abstract mind, so at home in the contemplation of knowledge while devoid of any relationship with its 
production. The passage refers to the stirrings of desire for the young woman, Pat Conley, an instance where the situation 
depends entirely on his involvement, having meaning for the very reason that it is Runciter himself who is 
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experiencing this particular feeling in this particular context. His criterion of knowledge on the other hand is, like a testing 
battery, instrumental and objective, rendering the experience of his own engagement with the world 'cloudy' and apparently 
'pointless,' to be conducted beneath the threshold of his awareness. Runciter's standpoint is indicated by one of his own agents 
when, dreaming of an encounter with a pair of Psis (whom we later find to be a manifestation of Jorry), she tells them: 
Perhaps your definition of your self-system lacks authentic boundaries. You've erected a precarious 
structure of personality on unconscious factors over which you have no control. [44]
When we then come upon Joe Chip in meditation on his plight, the 'boundaries' that our agent spoke of, together with their 
authenticity, are proving to be less than certain:
An unnatural and gigantic force, haunting their lives. Emanating either within the living world or the half-life 
world; or, he thought suddenly, perhaps both. In any case, controlling what they experienced, or at least a 
major part of it...Ubiquity, he realised all at once...[125]
So, while Dick has, over the course of the novel, come to elaborate more explicitly his picture of the universe as 'an idea in the 
minds of men,' he is here suggesting something a little different from the executive ideal of Runciter's world view; the potent  
force to which he refers is itself the arbiter of things in the world of Ubik. In what was quoted above, the reference is clearly to 
the enervating, entropic force with which Jorry is identified. Later, however, in an important passage we see that the 
ramifications of Joe Chip's earlier observation extend beyond Jorry and provide the reader with an insight into an agent that 
is, as the title suggests, 'everywhere.' The key scene takes place in a drugstore as Joe attempts to purchase a cannister of the 
all-important Ubik from the reluctant pharmacist (who is in fact the 'polymorphic' Jorry in another of his guises). Rather than 
the necessary spray can, the product has regressed along with the rest of the environment and is available only in the form of 
a blue jar containing an old-time liver and kidney balm. This being of no use to Joe, he vainly attempts to induce the Ubik to 
evolve into its 1992 form by simply willing the change. It appears the empirical reality standard has slipped – along with the 
world we are accustomed to. Although failing in his attempt to effect the change himself we see, as Joe slumps dejectedly on a 
park bench, that his efforts have been sufficient to summon a mysterious young woman who is able to present him with a 
brand new spray can full of the Ubik formula. She informs him that 'You brought me from the future, by what you did there 
inside the drugstore a few moments ago' [204]. 
In speculating about the challenge that Ubik presents to his authority, Jorry decides that it 'originates from within our 
environment. It has to, because nothing can come in from outside except words' [189]. It seems, given what we find in the final 
chapter's epigraph, that Jorry is close but simply hasn't gone far enough: 
I am Ubik. Before the universe was, I am. I made the suns. I made the worlds. I created the lives and the 
places they inhabit; I move them here, I put them there. They go as I say, they do as I tell them. I am the word 
and my name is never spoken, the name which no one knows. I am called Ubik, but that is not my name. I am. 
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I shall always be. [207]
This passage casts Ubik as an analogue of John's Logos, 'In the beginning was the Word...all things were made through him.' In 
this way Ubik's nature is further clarified as being the 'model' of all 'types,' it is the creative principle, identical with  language 
insofar as language in Dick's thinking bears responsibility for the creation of worlds no less than the mediation and migration 
between those worlds. In turn, Joe Chip's participation with Ubik, in the form of his emergent awareness of the world as 'idea,'  
is perhaps in kind with Ubik's 'song of itself,' a promise of joining beginning and end, the realisation of a process by which mind 
and matter, conscious understanding and unconscious force, generation and corruption, are reconciled. These binaries 
become figures of the process by which the individual (Joe Chip), uniting in an act of conception subject with object, is himself 
realised. As Georg Kühlewind, the philosopher and student of Steiner's epistemological work describes it, 'To become aware of  
the Logos is to become aware of the Logos in oneself.'17
In a letter dated March 4th 1975, Dick describes the role of language in significant terms:
General Semantics, is totally insane. Words are real – if coupled with something else. They are signals. Like 
when you see a red light along the road. It is real, but it refers to something, a context. But to say, “That red 
light is an illusion,” is to deny the reality of the context as well: and the power of that context to give or take 
life.
We must be calm and serious here because what [the critic, Frederic] Jameson is alluding to is that 
somehow language is a set [genuine reality] in which salvation can overcome the evil of physical power. 18
In common with the description given by Rudolf Steiner earlier, we see again here the way in which Dick describes a world 
given as a duality - 'word' and 'context' - that are, by the thinking activity, united in a particular instance by what Steiner calls  
the act of knowledge, a similarly transformative gesture. A connection can be made between Ubik  and what Dick writes here by 
recognising the connection between Ubik the remedy and Joe Chip's emergent awareness of his own agency in the 
construction of reality. The objective and empirically minded Glen Runciter is the exemplar of a disposition that conceives of 
knowledge as ideas about the world in contrast to Joe Chip who finds as the novel develops that ideas are the world; rather 
than linguistic signifiers of self-dependent entities, words are revealed as the Word by which a thing comes to be. Questioning 
the connection between word and context, for example, or concept and thing, introduces a misconception derived from the 
Cartesian prejudice with which we began. As Bortoft has pointed out, in making such a distinction we bring the distinguished 
into being in just that way not because of the alienation of mind and matter but in recognition of their essential relatedness. 
Considered in terms of 'Logos-structure,' body is as printed text –  linguistic sign – and mind the meaning we thereby derive.  
Distinguishing is also, therefore, relating, and each a function of cognition. The Logos or 'Word'-structure is in this way the 
two-fold manifestation of a single world. 
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The world of Jorry's mind and its regressive entropy is the world of reality in its crudest form. In this world of the past it  
appears at first as if, reality being finished and complete without us, we are entirely unfree, that all meaning is given, which is  
to say that there is 'no underlying pattern or meaning.' This 'wordless' world imposes itself on the novel's characters by 
isolating each of them in an environment in which their cognitive life, and therefore their individuality, has no reality, replacing 
language, or the Word, as the common element, as the basis for a common relationship to the world, with ' a tropism...urging 
[them] toward death, decay, and nonbeing' [169]. Cognition is of nominal value only and, ultimately, not even that, assuming 
inexorably' the attribute of pure mass.' Revelation here is the advent of an apocalypse by which, in realising our identity with 
purely determined and natural processes, we realise also the end of all identity. Ironically, Dick has dramatised the projection 
of a positivist world view by taking it at its word, picturing as he does a cognition of only nominal value, in which ideas and 
concepts have no ontological existence. Looked at in this way the figure of Jorry becomes an anthropomorphism of a world 
view in which all value is arrogated by his hunger, his desire for self-preservation. Jorry strips the world of its qualities, 
rendering it meaningless. Egoism here is also nihilism; meaninglessness for human life is also its death, 'for if human life is not 
a part of the world, of what is it a part?'19
Georg Kühlewind, building on indications in the philosophical work of Rudolf Steiner, develops an important distinction between 
thinking and 'the already thought.' Such a distinction demonstrates the way in which dialectical, dualistic thought is itself  
derivative of thinking and only in this sense can be claimed as characteristic of the world 'in itself.' This 'past' or, 'dead' 
thinking, as Kühlewind sometimes calls it, is a residue of the dynamic activity productive of the relatively concrete ideas and 
concepts with which we understand our world; it is the 'formation' relative to the 'formative,' thought relative to thinking. In  
this way the experience of disjunction between mind and matter is mirrored in the qualitative alienation of thought from 
thinking.  And, just as its idea can be understood to 'complete' a sensory phenomenon the experience of thinking can reunite a 
particular idea with the 'world' from which it emerges. That this activity is not usually noticed is due, paradoxically, to its 
centrality. Every observation or thought – every thing – depends upon it, making it all but transparent to our habitual 
consciousness. Ordinarily, as we look through a window, we only notice the window itself if, through some defect in its 
fabrication, it distorts the image we would otherwise expect to see clearly. What is usually noticed is the image that presents 
itself; it is perhaps only in exceptional circumstances that we attend also to the medium by which it emerges. And, even then, 
we notice the image, the thought, only after it has come to be, in, as it were, the past. Our conscious experience appears 
limited to the 'remnants, to what has dropped from presence into the rigid framework of the psychological time of mutually 
exclusive passing moments, whose present moment inevitably escapes us. Our consciousness is of this past alone, of what we 
have already thought (we cannot recall when).'20 For Kühlewind and Steiner this demarcation forms a significant first step in 
overcoming dialectical consciousness and the problem of epistemology from which it has emerged and to which it leads. In 
noticing this boundary we have in fact taken the first step beyond it in that it can no longer be considered determinative in 
nature for, as Kühlewind frequently reminds his reader, how could we even make such a statement if it were? Whether 
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intended in precisely this way or not, Joe Chip's 'manifestation of the future' – in the form of a can of Ubik – can certainly be 
seen as such a threshold moment. For in recognising that the petrifying decay and death of Jorry's world may be overcome by 
his own cognitive agency, by his own ability to manifest the meaning which makes a human world possible, he not only 
resurrects his own existential potency but accepts responsibility for Jorry's world – he realises in the fullest sense that that 
world is also this world. 
                                                                              
1   Bortoft, Henry. The Wholeness of Nature. Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne Books, 1996. 188.  
2   Dick, Philip K. "How To Build A Universe That Doesn't Fall Apart Two Days Later." The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick,  
Selected Literary and Philosophical Writings. Ed. Lawrence Sutin. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995. 261.  
3   Bortoft. 358, n.31.
4   Ibid., 359. 
5   Bamford, Christopher. “Quilting Green Hermeticism: A Tissue of Texts and Tracings.” Green Hermeticism. Ed. Christopher 
Bamford. Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne Books, 2007. 135.  
6   Dick, Philip K. "How To Build A Universe That Doesn't Fall Apart Two Days Later." The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick,  
Selected Literary and Philosophical Writings. Ed. Lawrence Sutin. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995. 265. 
7   Bortoft. 136.
8   Steiner, Rudolf. The Philosophy of Freedom, The Basis for a Modern World Conception, Trans. Wilson, Michael. Forest Row, 
East Sussex: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1999. 42-3.  
9   Ibid. 42-3.
10  Ibid. 124. 
11  Steiner, Rudolf. Goethe's World View. Trans. Lindeman, William. Spring Valley, NY: Mercury Press, 1985.  
12  Bortoft. 385. 
13  Steiner, Rudolf. The Philosophy of Freedom, The Basis for a Modern World Conception, Trans. Wilson, Michael. Forest Row, 
East Sussex: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1999. 89.  
14  Dick, Philip K. In Pursuit of Valis: Selections from the Exegesis. Ed. Sutin, Lawrence. Novato, California: Underwood-Miller, 
1991. 161.  
15  “Theory of Forms.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. Last accessed April 14th, 2011. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_forms#cite_ref-29  >  
16  Plato. Cratylus. Trans. Fowler, Harold N. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1921. 440 a & b.   
25
<  http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DCrat.%3Asection  %3D440a  >  
17  Kühlewind, Georg. Becoming Aware of the Logos. Trans. Schwarzkopf, Friedemann and Jeane. Great Barrington, MA: 
Lindisfarne Books, 1985. 13.  
18  Dick, Philip K. The Selected Letters of Philip K. Dick 1975-1976. Ed. Don Herron. Nevada City, CA: Underwood Books, 1993. 130. 
19  Kühlewind, Georg. Stages of Consciousness. Trans. St. Goar, Maria. West Stockbridge, MA: Lindisfarne Press, 1984. 10.  




the  stigmata of 
palmer eldritch
AND AS WE BEAR THE IMAGE OF THE MAN OF DUST, SO WE SHALL BEAR THE IMAGE OF THE MAN OF HEAVEN. 
1 CORINTHIANS 15:49
BUT FOLLOW THOU, AND FROM SPECTATOR TURN
ACTOR OR VICTIM
P.B SHELLEY, THE TRIUMPH OF LIFE
Our introduction to The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch is also an initiation into its protagonist's troubled world. Barney 
Mayerson's desperation to avoid the United Nations' sanctioned draft to an off-world colony is, at the outset, the futile defiance 
of an inescapable destiny. His earth, suffering massive environmental decline, is itself only the outcome of a social reality 
applying, without exception, to each one of its constituents. Barney's responsibility for such an environment is as negligible as 
his agency within it – this is just the way of things. Ultimately, his fitness is a matter of survival only; his sense of himself  
arrested, captured entirely by the world as he knows it. The real business of life, to which the rest is almost incidental, is the 
production and consumption of goods. This, in fact, is the arbiter of Barney's personal and professional fortunes. As senior 
'Pre-Fash' consultant for P.P. Layouts, Barney is responsible for predicting the trend of fashions that  will generate demand for 
the types of consumables to be produced. P.P. Layouts is a corporation producing and marketing 'mins' or, 'miniature layouts,'  
small models of everyday earth life complete with accessories and dolls of the central figure 'Perky' Pat Christensen and her 
boyfriend Walt Essex. Barney, by way of his 'pre-cognitive' ability, chooses which of the latest fashionable consumer goods P.P. 
Layouts will miniaturise. Conditions on the off-world colonies to which Barney is so determined to avoid being drafted are such 
that the hapless colonists spend much of their time using these mins to escape from the meaningless drudgery of their 
extraterrestrial lives. The indispensable element of this escapism is the drug Can-D. It is a narcotic that, in conjunction with the 
dolls and their mins, induces in the user an apparently consensual experience known as 'communication' in which the men and 
women participating co-habit within the sensory and, to an extent, psychological experience of Walt and Pat respectively. While 
P.P. Layouts's trafficking of the drug is illegal, the U.N. chooses not to interfere for as long as they also benefit from the 
associated financial gain, the drug's use ultimately contributing to their political and economic hegemony. This is the 'lousy 
situation' with which the novel begins. 
The 'hot, hostile sun' that beats down on the earth ('Terra') of Three Stigmata has become so damaging that a new index of 
temperature has been formulated to account for it: a certain number of 'Wagners' is the term for each increment on the scale.  
As the oceans evaporate, humidity is likewise unprecedented; each step on the scale by which its level is determined is now 
referred to as a 'Selkirk.' The retreat of the earth's glaciers is also recorded; the unit of measurement is a 'Grable.' Richard 
Hnatt, the husband of Barney Mayerson's ex-wife, Emily, is introduced reflecting on these grim facts in his 'miserably high-
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number conapt building 492 on the outskirts of Marilyn Monroe, New Jersey' [6]. Richard Wagner, Alexander Selkirk, Betty 
Grable and, of course, Marilyn Monroe, are both significant cultural figures and terms for the degrees of a composite index by 
which Dick communicates the significant standard against which environmental change is measured. That this is quite 
specifically intended is confirmed by the pointed reference to that 'miserably high-number' address of Hnatt's. In this  
connection, Barney's desperation to dodge the U.N. draft is less a desire to avoid re-location to an inhospitable environment – 
the difference in this respect between Terra and the Martian colony the narrative introduces being, perhaps, negligible – and 
far more to do with maintaining his position of relative social prosperity; his own conapt building is numbered 33 and, as the 
reader shortly discovers, his residence there had sometime earlier presented him with a choice between expulsion from this 
accommodation or divorce from his then wife Emily. A more effective measure of earth's climate is ultimately established 
through reference to his decision. 
Given the almost off-hand references to a dying world it might strike the reader as something of an irony that Mayerson is  
most sorely pressed by a social reality that, as the novel begins, appears to represent an irrepressible imperative to which 
Barney is inextricably beholden. The narrative juxtaposition of the story's Martian colonists with Barney and Richard Hnatt is  
immediately evident and only heightened by the virtual worlds upon which each set of characters rely for confirmation and 
solace and with which their respective realities are largely identified. 
He was Walt. He owned a Jaguar XXB sports ship with a flatout velocity of fifteen thousand miles an hour. His 
shirts came from Italy and his shoes were made in England. As he opened his eyes he looked for the little GE 
clock TV set by his bed... [43]
Into this complex Dick introduces the figure of Palmer Eldritch. 'Well-known interplan industrialist,' Eldritch 'had gone to the 
Prox system a decade earlier at the invitation of the Prox Council of Humanoid types' [11]. These 'Prox-men' had wanted 
Eldritch's help in modernising their own production facilities along the lines of their 'Terran' counterparts. However, reading 
his morning 'pape, Barney discovers there that Eldritch, his decade-long absence at an end, has now returned. 
It would probably be better for Terra if this wasn't Eldritch coming back, he decided. Palmer Eldritch was too 
wild and dazzling a solo pro; he had accomplished miracles in getting autofac production started on the 
colony planets, but – as always he had gone too far, schemed too much. Consumer goods had piled up in 
unlikely places where no colonists existed to make use of them. Mountains of debris, they had become... [11]
Barney's misgivings concerning Eldritch are shared by his boss and head of P.P. Layouts, Leo Bulero. We meet Bulero for the 
first time as he is engaged in a vid-call, discussing the likely ramifications of the U.N.'s unexpected seizing of a shipment of his 
Can-D. It appears that Eldritch has returned to the Sol system with a cargo hold full of a narcotic lichen very similar to that 
from which Can-D is synthesised. This suggests a likely cause for the shifting power relations between P.P. Layouts and the U.N. 
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